Reforms is a continuous process of improving and updating the existing laws, rules, regulations, practices and procedures for the benefit of the people. It is aimed at fulfilling the needs, hopes and aspirations of the people. The need for reform arises whenever the weaknesses and limitations of any law or rule are identified in the course of its implementation and practice. Therefore, reforms are taking place everywhere every now and then. It may happen in politics, in state principles, in business, in economic activities, in international systems and, even, in the playgrounds. Since reforms are always for improvement, betterment and for ensuring equal benefits to all, nobody opposes them.

Why the Reforms and the Main Areas of Reforms

In this presentation, the reforms we are going to discuss are the 14 Party Electoral Reform proposals covering the following issues:

1. Reforms in the Care-taker Government system.

2. Reforms in the Election Commission

3. Reforms in the Election Laws, Rules, Regulations and system.

The reforms proposal covering the above three areas were formulated in the interest of holding a free and fair election and took into consideration the following points:

1. Weaknesses in the Caretaker Government system as identified during 2001 general election. Particularly troublesome are (a) the vesting of absolute power to a partisan President that extends from appointing the Advisers to taking any major policy decision convenient to the political party to which he belongs and (b) the holding of the portfolio of the Defense Ministry by the partisan President with authority to deploy and use the Armed Forces in the interest of BNP- Jamat Alliance.

2. The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution that ensured the appointment of Justice K.M Hassan, a former active member of BNP, as the Chief Adviser of the next Caretaker Government.

3. The transformation of the Election Commission into a subordinate entity of the Prime Minister’s Office with a view to manipulating the election.

4. The appointment of controversial, incompetent and partisan persons as Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners. (By now, of course they have completely forfeited their credibility and the EC has been turned into a farce.).

5. The mess that an incompetent EC made of the preparation of electoral roll

6. The total politicization of the Civil Service and also of the entire field civil and police administration in districts and thanas to win the election through a planned election engineering and rampant rigging.

7. The fact of widespread false voting, breach of peace in the polling centres, the dominance of the mastans, and the free play of black money in the election.

The Formulation and Presentation of the Reform Proposals to the Nation In the backdrop of the above scenario, the reform proposals were placed before the nation a year ago on 15 July 2005. In their initial reaction the 4 Party Alliance had summarily rejected them. Such instant reaction from the Alliance might have resulted from their fear that people were not going to vote for them. in a free and fair election because of their utter failure in governance. In fact, they do not stand a chance to even compete due to their notorious reputation especially in corruption and terrorism. In view of the position taken by the by the 4 Party Alliance and their outright rejection of the Reform proposals the opposition justifiably mobilized public opinion in the country through publicity, meetings and grand assemblies all over the country. A very strong public opinion thus surfaced in favour of the Reform programme and the international community also took note of its reasonableness and necessity.

The Alliance Government in deference to the growing public demand for the Reform proposals changed its stance and suggested that the parliament is the appropriate forum for discussing the subject. Even though the parliament had been rendered dysfunctional by the treasury bench and its partisan Speaker, the opposition decided to leave no stone unturned for the cause of the Reform. Sheikh Hasina as the Leader of the opposition presented the Reform proposals in the Parliament on 12 February. The immediate result was an upbeat optimism in the country and the people were convinced that a national dialogue would soon ensue. But to the utter surprise of all at her concluding speech at the parliamentary session the Prime Minister left the matter hanging. Even though she took a fortnight to formulate her response to the formal presentation of the Reform proposals. She was hesitant in making any commitment. She did not refer the subject to any Parliamentary Committee but instead announced that her Party would initiate action to from a Committee for dialogue. However, it was still believed that the door for a dialogue between the ruling alliance and the opposition was at last opened for resolving the Reform issue amicably.

The Dialogue and the Doubt

But, the ruling coalition took another 15 days to authorize the Secretary General of BNP to send a letter to the Secretary General of Awami League asking for nomination of members to be included in the proposed Committee. This letter was so incomplete and vague that it failed to spell out the nature, the composition and the terms of reference of the Committee. This compelled the 14 Party forum to seek for clarification of these points through a letter very promptly within 48 hours of receipt of communication from the ruling coalition. But the BNP Secretary General took more than 7 day’s time to send a reply to it. Since then, the exchange of letters between BNP and Awami League has continued. By this time, as many as 7 letters have been exchanged between the two sides. Throughout this exchange of communication, the Government side was abnormally slow in sending their replies. Some of their replies even took more than 2 weeks time. The reply to the 7th letter of Awami League is being awaited from BNP for about two months. It should be noted that the Government side has not only been abnormally slow in sending their replies, but also been displaying a lack of earnestness in their proposal for the dialogue. It is not unreasonable to surmise that the BNP-Jamat Alliance is following a laid-back attitude with a view to delaying any serious dialogue.

While this charade about dialogue is on we also notice that Khaleda Zia and her other cabinet colleagues in their campaign speeches are continuing to deride the Reform agenda. They are maintaining that reforms are not necessary and the opposition is only carrying out the movement to destabilize the political situation. They emphasize that the existing laws and regulations are more than adequate for a free and fair election. The PM in particular termed the reform demand as a ploy to impede her “outstanding development performance”. Of course, her concept of development spurt is high rate of inflation, acute crisis in the supply of gas and power, critical shortage of fertilizers, diesel and kerosene, unprecedented brutality by the law enforcing agencies, rampant land grabbing by her disciples and colleagues, sky-high corruption by all around her and her administration. In one word economic development of the BNP-Jamat variety means prosperity for the family of the PM and the powerful elite of the Alliance and their cronies on the one hand, and, on the other, a marked slide in the living conditions of the vast masses. The public stance of the leaders of the Alliance casts doubt about their sincerity in respect of the reform proposals.

The ground reality is that the BNP-Jamat Alliance has carefully drawn an election engineering plan to ensure their victory in the election come what may. They have ensured through a constitutional amendment to have the Caretaker Government of their choice. They have planned to use the Armed forces and other law enforcing agencies to terrify opposition voters and secure their submission. They have set up an Election Commission that will do everything to rig the election in their favour. They have so set up the district civil and police administration with loyal officers to ensure the defeat of their rivals. It is also suspected that in order to stem any groundswell of public wrath against them they would unleash the militants to create havoc in the society and set in a reign of terror in the country. They are totally unwilling to accept any reform measures. In their game plan they are counting that in the last resort the partisan President will take charge of the election. They are determined to perpetuate their rule and enjoy the fruits of their plunder of the wealth of the nation. Both the PM and her son has warned their followers time and again to stop the AL projecting dire consequences for the Alliance people in case they fail to return to power They are afraid that any defeat in the upcoming election will force their leaders to flee the country and may deprive them of their ill-gotten wealth.

Under the circumstances they have adopted the policy of delaying the dialogue and putting up roadblocks to it. The Reform proposals include exclusion of religious parties from seeking election and also use of religion in electoral campaigns. Sensing that BNP might include Jamat in the dialogue to thwart the process altogether some members of the 14 Party forum, at the very beginning of the exchange of letters, gave indications that simply the Awami League could hold dialogue with BNP alone. But the BNP Secretary General without taking this point into consideration named a notorious war criminal and patron of fanatic terrorist groups Ali Ashan Al-Mujahidi of Jamat to represent the ruling Alliance in the dialogue. The 14 party forum could not entertain this proposal and the Awami League Secretary General in his last letter categorically mentioned their inability to sit for dialogue with such a person. The BNP-Jamat Alliance appears to have intentionally created a dead-lock. They are arguing that it is for them to decide as to who should represent them and the opposition should desist from imposing restrictions on it. They are also suggesting that since the opposition sits with the Jamat MPs in parliament and parliamentary Committees, they have no reason to refuse to sit with them for the dialogue. Further, they are falsely publicizing that the opposition forces in earlier political movements for dislodging the military ruler and securing the system of Caretaker government have had dialogue with the Jamat and were on the same platform. BNP Senior Joint Secretary and PM’s son, Tareq Zia has further stated that BNP and Jamat belong to the same family and they are inseparable. The Jamat leaders have also warned that the Alliance should act together and resist all divisive moves. It has been made very clear that BNP will not sit in a dialogue without the Jamat participation.

The Deadlock

Some quarters relying on the Goeblian propaganda of the Alliance are advocating that in order to avoid a crisis Awami League and its partners should agree to sit with Jamat. It should be clarified that Awami League never had any political dialogue with Jamat. During the mass movement against military dictatorship in late 1980s till 1990, the 15 party front led by Awami League and the 7 party front led by BNP played the leading roles. Both the political fronts launched simultaneous political programmes from their respective political platforms. And Jamat was not included in either of the fronts. Jamat in order to camouflage their isolation and to take advantage of a popular movement took up some insignificant programmes. All these programmes were confined to two areas: one in front their party office at Maghbazar and another on the northern side of the Baitul Mukarram Mosque. It so happened that some of the Jamat programmes were in line with the simultaneous programmes of the 15 party and 7 Party fronts. Such coincidence of events does not necessarily mean that Jamat participated in the 1990 mass movement on the same platform as that of Awami League or BNP. In the movement for the Caretaker government in 1994-96 again Jamat unlike JP or other parties was not accepted by AL as a partner and there was also no electoral alliance with Jamat at any time. In 1991 when Jamat won seats in the parliament AL refused any coalition with them while BNP entered into a clandestine understanding. Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury who contested for Presidency in 1991 was an independent candidate whom AL chose to support. He was not an AL candidate and he might have sought support from Jamat. AL never had any word with Jamat about the election of the President then. In 1996 when AL formed the government Jamat joined the opposition bench in the parliament with BNP. In the parliament it is true that AL sits in it as well as in parliamentary Committees with Jamat. This is done to respect the wishes of the people who chose to elect Jamat MPs and there is never any collaboration between AL and Jamat there. Jamat ideology and philosophy as well as their role as a political party are believed by AL to be opposed to the interests of a secular and syncretic Bangladesh and that is why AL cannot be in a dialogue with the representatives of this party. Moreover some of the issues for discussion in the dialogue are about forbidding the religious character of political parties, the exploitation of religion in election and the patronage and sponsorship of militant fanaticism by Jamat in Bangladesh. How can these subjects be dealt meaningfully in the presence of the accused party?

Jamat and its Role

It is urgent that one should know a little bit about Jamat before requesting AL to sit in a dialogue with their presence. Jamat as a political party had illegitimate and anti-national origin. It was set up in 1941 at the behest of the British colonial rulers to puncture the freedom movement. They pleaded for continuation of British rule in India in the interest of the Muslims. They violently opposed the Pakistan movement. But then their founder Abul Al Maudoodi moved to Pakistan to fish in troubled waters and sponsored the anti-Qadiani riots in Lahore in 1953. Maudoodi and another of his associates were sentenced to death for their role in the riots. He escaped death at the intervention of Saudi Arabia and other political machinations. Maudoodi went to Cairo before forming his party and established links with Ikhwanul Muslimin or Islamic Brotherhood movement. Jamat’s mission is Jehad and their political objective is establishment of an Islamic state system. During our War of Liberation in 1971 they supported the military dictator of Pakistan and contributed to the Rajakar force of 40,000 collaborators that Pakistan raised in Bangladesh. They also formed the killer squads of Al Badar and Al Shams that undertook killing on a mass scale of Muslim and Hindu intellectuals, teachers, professionals and the like to deprive the Bengali society of progressive thinkers and leaders. They carried out genocide of the Hindus, plundered the properties of opponents of Pakistan occupation force, and ruthlessly killed and persecuted innocent civilians alleging that they were supporters of the Liberation War. After Liberation many of them including their main leader Ghulam Azam fled the country and took shelter in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In Bangladesh they went into hiding while their leaders were imprisoned as enemy collaborators. Some of them also courted imprisonment to save themselves from the vengeance of their victims. They emerged only after November 1973 when the Father of the Nation in a magnanimous gesture bidding to unify the nation granted general amnesty to the collaborators. Under the Constitution of 1972 they were, however, debarred from contesting in national elections [Article 66 (2) (c)] and could not form a political party as religion based parties were forbidden in Bangladesh {Article 38}. General Ziaur Rahman in a bid to legitimize his military rule allowed religion-based parties and began registration of political parties in 1976 and Jamat was registered as one of the first parties. He also allowed Ghulam Azam to visit Bangladesh and stay there on a visa. This visit never ended and Khaleda Zia conferred him the citizenship of the country in 1993. Jamat opposed the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign nation and not even now have they acknowledged their guilt. It is generally believed that they want to capture state power and establish an Islamic state here and probably turn the country into a part of the Federation of Pakistan.

Jamat in Bangladesh thrived under military rule. They became active in the Rohingya refugee camps and their connection with Saudi aid (Rabita e Alam) and Pakistan military (Inter Services Intelligence) helped them to set up militant groups in the country. They also organized their student wing (Islami Chatra Shibir) in a military fashion and undertook conquest of University campuses in Rajshahi, Chittagong, Islamic, Shahjalal and Jahangirnagar universities by setting up colonies of followers and cadres around the campuses. Some of these colonized villages are like arsenals of military units. They also recruited and sent volunteers to fight against Soviet Russia in Afghanistan. In 1991 Jamat gained some respectability by joining the movement against military dictatorship and for the first time secured a few seats in parliament. They formed a clandestine coalition with BNP and began to establish their hold. They picked some Madrassas as their centres of indoctrination and military training and began to form militant groups mainly with support from Pakistan. Some of the militants went to Afghanistan and participated in the civil war there. By the end of 1990s the trained cadres inflated and they were organized into separate entities such as Harkatul Jehad, Shahadat-al- Hikma, Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh etc. Later these groups multiplied and in one count there are 58 of them now with HJ, JMB and Jagrata Muslim Janata (JMJB) being at the head of the pack. All of them, however, remained linked to Jamat and most of their leaders were Jamat and Shibir leaders. They initiated their military adventure in the country towards the end of the term of office of the Awami League government. Their electoral alliance with BNP and JP in 2000 gave them more confidence and greater strength. They targeted progressive forces such as Udichi conference in Jessore, Communist Party conference in Dhaka, Chayanaut new years day in Ramna; Awami League leadership such as Sheikh Hasina’s meeting in Kotalipara or Narayngunj AL office; and institutions of miniority groups such as Ahmadia mosque in Khulna or Christian church in Gopalganj.

After the victory in the rigged election of 2001 Jamat became a partner in the Alliance government and their militant followers played havoc first with minority strongholds of AL and then with secular institutions and practices and then with AL leaders and workers. Not a single bomb blast or grenade attack or gunfire was made against a Jamat, BNP, or JP leaders or gatherings. They killed AL and opposition leaders, attacked cinema halls, village fairs, jatras, shrines, BRAC and Grameen Bank offices. Finally in August 2005, they demonstrated their might to strike anywhere at will and then began their attack on symbols of modern state system such as the secular laws and courts of law. Jamat and a section of the conservative BNP alongwith rogue and idealistic elements of law enforcing agencies are in the game. After the attack on the courts, some arrests were made and terrorists involved in August 2005 event were hauled up. Later in early 2006, some top leaders of JMB and JMJB were arrested and also tried in some cases. Most of these criminals, fanatic leaders, suicide-bombers and activists have already confessed their deep involvement with Jamat and Shibir. They have also threatened to disclose their links with government leaders and law enforcing agencies. Their international links and funding from external sources and domestic Jamat business enterprises such as Islamic banks and shopping plazas are also an open secret. There is no shadow of doubt on the deep links between Jamat and the militant groups. The temporary lull and the arrest and trial of some top extremist militants is only a charade and Awami League and the opposition forces suspect that when election time will come, the extremists will be out in the field in full force.

What should the 14 party forum do under the circumstances? Some aspects of the Reform proposals hinge on banning religion based politics or exploitation of religion in election campaigns and controlling fanatic militancy and general terrorism prevailing in the country. Should the opposition camp discuss these issues with the promoters of religion in politics and the perpetrators of fanatic militants and their patrons? We believe that a dialogue with Jamat participation is futile and by no means can we compromise on sitting with the Rajakars. The deadlock can be resolved by the government by dropping the Jamat representative from their negotiating team. If there is sincerity in resolution of the impasse and undertaking of electoral reforms, the public utterances of the government leaders must not deride and reject the Reform proposals offhand. The opposition forces are always ready for a dialogue and they have left no stone unturned to achieve this objective. It is the obstinate stand of Khaleda Zia that has made the consideration of the reform proposals completely uncertain. This situation has cast doubt about even the holding of the next general election on time. As a consequence, the nation is going to face a serious constitutional crisis. If such an unwanted situation arises it is difficult to speculate as to what will happen next. Optimistic as we are we shall continue to hope that the deadlock will be broken and a dialogue between the treasury and opposition benches will take place. The objective after all is non-partisan – the holding of a free and fair election.

The Needed Electoral Reforms

What must be done to avoid the looming crisis is detailed below: ·

> Negotiators from both sides should formulate a common minimum agenda. For the implementation of such an agenda necessary rules and regulations or code of conduct may be promulgated. If agreed the required constitutional amendment may also be adopted. If a constitutional amendment cannot be made an understanding may be reached on actions to take. The following actions are not designed to give advantage to one party over another but they are intended to ensure the right of franchise to all citizens and also the majority of their will in electing their representatives. Proportional representation is, no doubt, reflective of popular will but this has not been broached here as it is still not that evident to people at large.

Caretaker Government

Such actions in respect of the Caretaker government will be as follows.

a. The Chief Advisor should be selected by consensus among political parties as it was done in 1990. In actual fact it would mean an agreement between the leaders of the treasury and opposition benches. In order to implement the agreement the last retired Chief Justice K. M. Hasan and others who are to be constitutionally considered may voluntarily decline and the consensus candidate is appointed the CA.

b. The Advisors should be selected also by consensus. The procedure followed in 1990 could be the precedent. Lists would be furnished by both sides and no one who is blackballed by one camp should be considered.

c. The defense portfolio should be handled by the Chief Advisor and his Council and not by the President.

d. The Caretaker Government should only look after routine work and assist the EC to hold a fair and free election.

Election Commission

Realizing that management of the election is the responsibility of the Election Commission (EC) several measures may be taken to secure an acceptable, respected and competent EC and such measures will be:

a. The Election Commission should be reconstituted with the Commissioners and the Chief Election Commissioner being chosen by consensus. The present Chief Election Commissioner and the other two Commissioners may then voluntarily resign from their posts making way for appointment of consensus candidates.

b. The EC should function as a body corporate and decisions should be taken by the Commission and not by the CEC in an arbitrary fashion.

c. The EC should be an independent body with its own secretariat and control over its budget. As an immediate step the EC should cease to be under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). It should select its own Secretary, possibly one of the Commissioners. Its officers should be under its control. It should prepare and implement its budget only securing the grant from the Finance Ministry after parliamentary approval.

d. Partisan Election officers appointed since October 2005 may be terminated or withdrawn. f. It will requisition services of officers and other personnel from the government for election duty and these officers and personnel for the duration of election duty will be fully controlled by the EC and the EC will have the powers to try or punish them without reference to the government. g. The EC should form all party election Observation Team for each constituency immediately declaration of the election schedule. The observation team will be the watch dog for listing of vulnerable centres, panel of election officers, supervision of violation of election rules and practices. h. The EC should take the lead in revising and putting in place a Code of Conduct developed with the participation of all political parties. Such a Code should have the force of law. In course of time when the Election Commission will, indeed, stand out prominently as an independent and effective institution it is likely that there will be no need for the Caretaker government at all.

Voter List Preparation

> The new EC may begin the work of updating of voters’ list in the usual way with the change that all listed voters should be photographed and their photos should appear with their names and particulars in the voters’ list. ·

> For Chittagong Hill Tracts list of permanent residents should be separately prepared. · Expatriate citizens should also be registered as voters in the constituencies of their choice and they should be enabled to cast their votes. ·

> Constitutionally there should be one voters’ list for each constituency (Article 121). So the list should be finalized 15 days before the election and it should be computerized and CDs should be furnished to the candidates 15 days before the election. Any deviation from the list should nullify the election of the constituency concerned.

Measures to Rectify Politicization of Administration

· As a remedial measure for politicization of administration

a. Appointments of all officers on contract should be terminated.

b. Top or important bureaucrats with reputation of partisan interest should be removed from sensitive and important posts.

c. All the field officers considered to be of partisan proclivities, especially Commissioners, DCs and UNOs and DIGs of Police, SPs and OCs of Thanas should be redeployed.

d. All fit lists should be voided so that new fit lists are made if necessary. This will also mean that all promotions given against expected vacancies must be voided as well.

e. Other measures for depoliticization of bureaucracy are not considered here but the future government must attend to it on an urgent basis. Without a neutral and efficient bureaucracy it is very difficult to establish good governance and promote rapid economic development.

f. The most important signal to the field administration in favour of a free and fair election is the fact as well as the perception of neutrality of the Caretaker government and the Election Commission. This has to be meticulously established and there was the main failure in 2001.

Ensuring the Quality of Candidates

· It is not enough to lay down the qualifications of candidates but more important is the publicity about it and there the EC and the civil society is the main player. Much can be achieved to control black money and muscle power by strictly enforcing the required credentials of candidates. The requirements are:

a. Financial position. Profession and source of income. Wealth statement and information on tax returns.

b. Debt & default. Loans taken or guaranteed and performance in repaying them.

c. Educational qualifications.

d. Work experience, including performance record for former MPs or elected officials.

e. Criminal record with details of trials and punishments, if any.

f. Record as a collaborator or anti-Liberation activist.

g. Record of retirement, resignation or termination of candidates who are former civil or military officers.

· Political parties have declared that mastans or their godfathers and holders of black money will not be given nominations. They have also promised to consult with grassroots in deciding nomination of candidates. It should be ensured that these pledges are duly honoured.

Expenditure Control to Reduce the Influence of Black Money

· Strict expenditure control and realistic limit fixation is very necessary. The EC should undertake candidates’ projection meetings and voter assistance programmes and this can substantially bring down election expenses. All meetings in the constituency and distribution of voters’ cards should be managed by the EC. The rule on candidate’s setting up only one central election office in each thana and only one office or camp in each union and municipal ward should be strictly enforced.

· The other activities that candidates can then perform legally after the installation of the Caretaker government will be postering without use of multicolour printing or painting, distribution of pamphlets and leaflets, only seven days of miking for eight hours a day and door to door campaigning. The limited activities by candidates will reduce election expenditure.

· Wall postering, gate construction, transportation of voters, pandal construction, decorative lighting and outdoor meetings will stand banned. Expenditure on a big scale can thus be eliminated. Vote buying, making promises to voters, bribing local leaders, feeding or entertaining voters are already banned but they are not strictly enforced. The observation team may enforce the rules relating to such restrictions.

· The time to be devoted to election propaganda by the electronic media should be pre-fixed and distributed equitably among parties.

· Candidates will submit statements on expected expenditure and sources of income while submitting nomination papers and then furnish actual expenditure statement within a month of election pointing out variations with estimated expenditure. These statements will be in the public domain.

· The permissible limit of expenditure should be realistic and it should relate to the physical and numerical size of the constituency. The violation of financial rules should entail debarment from election.

Control of Violence and Mastan Influence

· The Caretaker government should undertake recovery and instant destruction of illegal firearms as its first major task. UN Anti Terrorism Unit may be invited to supervise and help the operation.

· Vulnerable polling centres should be identified on clear criteria such as: a. reputation of violent behaviour in the past, b. concentration of voters from minority communities, c. centres where one party is traditionally dominant. The list should be prepared by the EC and given to contesting parties 15 days before the election for vetting. Strengthened security arrangements may be made in these centres. Foreign observers may also target these centres for observation.

· The exploitation of religion usually leads to violence. Misinterpretation of religion, accusing a party of anti-religious activities and communal propaganda are very volatile matters and they should be strictly prohibited.

· The armed forces should not be used for patrolling at all as the experience was very unfortunate in 2001 and panic creation is not desirable for a free and fair election. The amendment to PRO 1972 as made in 2001 to deploy armed units during election and give military officers police and magisterial powers must be reacanted. Armed units will be deployed in the district headquarters on the day of the election for any emergency duty that the Returning Officer may authorize and for which magistrates may be spared to accompany the deployed armed unit. They may also be used for protecting the ballot boxes in case the election is staggered over some days.

· Crowding in the polling centres should be strictly controlled. Only agents of major parties or alliances will be allowed; a party obtaining less than 5 percent of popular vote in the previous election will be debarred from posting any agent. No domestic observer can enter a polling station, they must stay outside.

Control of False Voting and Vote Counting

· The voter photo in the voters’ list and the reminder card issued to voters before the election day by the EC (not by parties as in the past) will be dependable precautionary measures.

· The ballot box should be a large transparent one so that votes are cast before the eyes of all and agents can then easily prevent vote stuffing.

· Care should be taken to prevent temporary occupation of polling centres by mastans and forcible ballot casting. The national observers staying outside the centre should play a helpful role along with party workers from all parties in preventing such a conquest. In known vulnerable centres security measures should prevent such an occurence. All party Observation Team can influence prevention of capture of polling centres by individual candidates.

· Consideration may be given to fixing maximum votes that can be cast in a booth. If votes cast in a centre are more than this maximum multiplied by the number of booths then the vote of the centre should be cancelled. This will reduce if not prevent ballot stuffing by all parties.

· False voting is assisted by polling Personers election officers (Presiding, Assistant PO and Polling officers) and hence they must be carefully selected and trained. If staggered voting is done then all election officers can be direct government employees. Teachers of Qaumi and similar Madrassas and Islamic Banks must be excluded from election duties. The panel of election officers for each district should be given to the candidates and the Observation Team and their objections, if any, should be respected. This was sloppily done in Chittagong Mayoral election.

· The arrangements in the polling centres can be either positive or negative in preventing false voting. Hence the list of polling centres should be handed over to the candidates 15 days before election to take care of any objections or suggestions for better management. The voters’ list also must be finalized at the same time and given to the candidates 15 days prior to election. Last minute revisions mostly include false voters.

· While use of microbuses, minibuses and three or two wheeled scooters are banned on the election day; powered boats should not be under such a ban. There should also be no ban on mobile phones.

· Vote counting, especially making bundles of 100 votes, should be carefully observed by agents and observers. Authenticated copies of results should be given to all agents of candidates by the PO. Alternative arrangements for lighting the counting centre should be taken in advance.

Other Measures

· Election observation by foreign groups should be for an extended period to observe and influence the environment for election. The EC should notify the particulars of observers’ groups well in advance of election - at least one month before the election. The groups will do well to choose mainly vulnerable centres for observation on election day. Instead of trying to cover too many polling centres they may better concentrate on limited centres and monitor voting there for all the day. They may seek local assistance to act as guides. They can enter polling centres and booths and also observe vote casting.

· National observers’ groups tend mostly to be partisan and therefore their activities should be limited and strictly controlled. First, they should be subjected to a careful scrutiny and they should be selected six months prior to the election. Then the lists should be given to the parties for their views and any group blacklisted by one of the major parties should be disbarred from observation.

· National observers cannot enter the polling centres on the election day but they can operate around the centres. They can help in preventing forcible occupation of centres, even for a temporary period, by mastans.

· All election observers should be assisted by the all party Observation Team and on their part the observers’ groups should be in touch with it and exchange views as they wish.

· Election cases must be settled by the tribunals within two months and appeals to Supreme Court also must be expeditiously dealt with. The EC must be pro-active in settling election cases.

Female Representation

· It is the pledge of all parties to reserve more seats for women and hold direct election for those seats.

Newsletter _______________________
Vol-5, No-4, July 16, 2006
Bangladesh Awami League Publication