From Nobel to Nightmare: How Yunus Opened the Gates to Islamist Militancy

Bangladesh today stands at a dangerous crossroads. What was once a nation born out of a secular, pluralistic vision in 1971 is now being dragged into the abyss of religious fundamentalism. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government on August 5, 2024, did not usher in stability; it opened the gates for extremism. And at the center of this crisis is Muhammad Yunus, the so-called “neutral” leader of the interim government, whose actions betray not neutrality but a calculated alignment with Islamist hardliners.

Islamic Fundamentalism Raises Its Head in Post-Hasina Bangladesh

Under his watch, banned outfits like Hizb ut-Tahrir have resurfaced, convicted militants have been released, and extremist leaders are being welcomed into the political and administrative mainstream. Shrines have been desecrated, minorities terrorized, women’s rights dismantled, and secularism itself is being erased from textbooks and constitutional language. This isn’t a failure of governance; it’s the deliberate empowerment of radicalism.

Yunus, hailed abroad as a Nobel laureate and microfinance pioneer, is exposing a far darker face at home: one of opportunism, betrayal, and complicity. By giving space to fundamentalists, he has weaponized religion as a political tool to strengthen his shaky grip on power. What Bangladesh now faces is not just political instability, but an existential crisis; its secular identity, its social fabric, and its very future are being held hostage to the ambitions of one man.

Understanding the Power Vacuum

When Sheikh Hasina’s democratically elected government collapsed on August 5, 2024, Bangladesh didn’t just lose a prime minister; it lost a stable, legitimate authority. The sudden fall created a leadership vacuum that left the nation vulnerable to unrest and opportunistic forces. In this moment of uncertainty, Muhammad Yunus stepped in as head of the interim government, presenting himself as a “neutral caretaker.”

But Yunus’s neutrality was only a mask. Unlike Hasina, he had no electoral mandate, no public legitimacy, and no track record of governance. To consolidate power quickly, he turned to groups that had long been kept in check: Islamist hard-liners, banned organizations, and convicted extremists.

US commission report: Religious freedom concerns persist in Bangladesh

In short, the fall of an elected government created a vacuum, but Yunus didn’t just fill it. He weaponized it, trading stability and secular governance for alliances with those who thrive on fear, division, and ideological control. The nation’s secular foundations, once protected under an elected government, now face unprecedented threats under an unelected administration.

Extremists in the Heart of Government

Once the interim government was in place, it didn’t take long for the lines between state and extremism to blur. What was once unthinkable in Bangladesh, convicted radicals and banned groups openly operating in politics, has now become routine under Muhammad Yunus. Instead of keeping extremists on the margins, his administration has welcomed them into the very core of governance.

Take the case of Nasimul Ghani, one of the founding members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh. Despite his documented links to a banned militant outfit, he now serves as Senior Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs, the very office tasked with overseeing national security. Putting a man with such ties in charge of internal security isn’t just reckless; it’s a direct invitation for extremists to influence the state from within.

Nasimul, Senior Secretary at Home Ministry, Tied to Hizb ut-Tahrir's Origins

He’s not alone. Mohammad Ejaz, twice arrested for his involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir, has been appointed as Administrator of Dhaka North City Corporation,a powerful role that gives him sweeping control over one of the country’s most important urban regions. These appointments are not accidents; they reflect a pattern. Individuals who should have been sidelined or monitored are instead being elevated to positions of authority.

Rising influence of Hizb ut Tahrir in Bangladesh

The danger doesn’t end there. Extremist clerics like Mufti Jasim Uddin Rahmani, the leader of Ansarullah Bangla Team, convicted for inciting the murder of secular blogger Rajib Haider, have also been released from prison. Within weeks of his release, Rahmani was back on stage, preaching the same brand of hate that once fueled brutal killings.

And perhaps most alarming of all, over 170 militants linked to banned outfits have been granted bail since the interim government took over. These are not low-level offenders but men tied to bombings, assassinations, and organized terror campaigns. While they walk free, critics of extremism are silenced, threatened, or pushed aside.

At the same time, Jamaat-e-Islami, long marginalized for its violent role in 1971 and subsequent militancy, is quietly regaining ground. Under the Yunus regime, Jamaat leaders enjoy unprecedented leniency in the courts, expanded access to media, and a renewed foothold in mainstream politics. What once seemed like a party consigned to history is now staging a political comeback, sheltered and emboldened by an interim government that appears more interested in appeasing extremists than protecting democracy.

Bangladesh Rewrites History

By placing extremists inside key institutions, tolerating their return to campuses, and allowing groups like Jamaat-e-Islami to re-enter the political stage, Yunus has done more than just tolerate radicalism; he has mainstreamed it. What should have been a firewall between the state and militancy has been dismantled, leaving ordinary citizens, minorities, and secular voices more vulnerable than ever.

Militants Back on the Streets and Campuses

The emboldening of extremists within government institutions has spilled onto the streets, and the results are visible across the country. Groups once forced underground are now out in the open, holding rallies, recruiting students, and flexing their power in ways that would have been unimaginable only a few years ago.

Meanwhile, since Hizb ut-Tahrir itself has made a full comeback, it now holds public rallies, press conferences, and open recruitment drives at universities like Dhaka University and Notre Dame College. Instead of facing crackdowns, the group enjoys quiet tolerance,if not outright approval,from authorities.

The story doesn’t end with Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hefazat-e-Islam, the powerful Islamist network, is again mobilizing massive crowds. Earlier this year, Hefazat staged a strong rally in Dhaka, demanding the disbandment of the Women’s Reform Commission, restoration of “full faith and trust in Allah” in the Constitution, and blanket amnesty for its leaders. These rallies are not fringe protests; they are demonstrations of power, intended to intimidate opponents and remind the nation that Islamist forces are back at the center of political life.

Once banned Islami Chhatra Shibir-backed panel wins Jahangirnagar University students’ union poll

On campuses, the rise of Islami Chhatra Shibir is another ominous sign. Backed by Jamaat-e-Islami, Shibir has secured unprecedented victories, winning both the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU) and Jahangirnagar University students’ union elections. These wins are more than student politics; they are stepping stones for Islamist consolidation, proving that extremist-aligned groups can now win in arenas once dominated by secular or centrist voices.

The consequences of this resurgence are not confined to politics and recruitment; they are increasingly violent. In Rajbari on September 6, 2025, a mob calling themselves Touhidi Janata stormed the shrine of Nurul Haque, known as Nural Pagla. What followed was sheer brutality: the mob desecrated the shrine, exhumed his body, and set it on fire in broad daylight. Police officers were attacked, vehicles torched, and devotees beaten. The horror of this event, broadcast widely on social media, sent a chilling message: extremists no longer fear the state; they act with impunity.

Shrine Attacked in Rajbari, Body Exhumed and Burned

These developments make one truth unavoidable: militants are not just back on the fringes; they are reclaiming public space, on the streets, in campuses, in shrines, and in the political discourse. And under Yunus’s watch, the state is not resisting this tide; it is enabling it.

Minority Communities Under Siege

As Islamist forces reclaim space under the Yunus regime, Bangladesh’s minority communities, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians, have found themselves once again living in fear. For decades, these groups have been part of the nation’s cultural mosaic, yet today they face renewed threats of violence, intimidation, and forced displacement.

As Bangladesh reinvents itself, Islamist hard-liners see an opening

In village after village, reports have surfaced of temples vandalized, churches attacked, and homes belonging to minority families torched. Many have fled ancestral lands after receiving threats, while others live in hiding, uncertain of whether the state will protect them. The exodus has been quiet but devastating, as families abandon livelihoods built over generations.

Christians in Bangladesh forced into hiding in wave of violence

Christians, in particular, have faced a chilling wave of hostility. As one report by Open Doors put it: “In the year since the fall of the government, Christians in Bangladesh have lived in the shadow of violence and fear.” Entire congregations have been driven underground, forced to worship in secrecy as mobs threaten open gatherings.

Under Sheikh Hasina’s elected government, such incidents were investigated, condemned, and often met with swift response. But under Yunus, silence has become the new policy. The interim administration’s reluctance to act has been read by extremists as a green light. Minority citizens, once shielded by the secular character of the state, are now treated as expendable.

For Bangladesh’s minorities, the rise of militancy is not just a political shift; it is a daily battle for survival.

The Political Calculus of Yunus

At the heart of this crisis lies the uncomfortable truth: the resurgence of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh is not simply an accident of circumstance; it is the byproduct of political choices made by Muhammad Yunus and his unelected interim government.

Yunus, hailed abroad as a Nobel laureate and “clean” reformer, has sought to legitimize his authority at home by appeasing groups long kept at the margins. With no electoral mandate and facing skepticism from both the Awami League and BNP camps, his administration turned to Islamist networks for political breathing space. The result has been the quiet rehabilitation of forces once thought to be relics of Bangladesh’s violent past.

The return of Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing Shibir is not coincidental. Nor is Hefazat-e-Islam’s newfound influence over campus and cultural life. Yunus has calculated that tolerating, even courting, these groups offers him a counterweight against mainstream political parties and an instrument to reshape Bangladesh’s fractured political landscape.

But this short-term strategy comes with long-term costs. Every concession to Islamist demands, whether sidelining secular voices in constitutional reform, ignoring attacks on minorities, or downplaying campus militancy, further entrenches extremism. By treating these groups as legitimate stakeholders, Yunus has opened the gates for their ideology to once again seep into the state machinery.

In contrast, Sheikh Hasina’s elected government, however contested and imperfect, kept a firm line against these actors. By banning Jamaat and curbing Hefazat’s influence, she sought to preserve Bangladesh’s secular identity. Yunus, lacking that political base, has instead traded principles for survival.

In the name of “pluralism” and “dialogue,” the interim regime has invited back those who dream of undoing the very foundations of 1971. The political calculus of Yunus may keep him afloat for now, but it risks pushing Bangladesh into a far darker future.